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Since the mid 1980s fixed term contracts have been used in many European countries to 
reduce firing costs. As this strategy may have led to segmented labour markets, recent policy 
interventions have enhanced permanent jobs by cutting their labour costs. Efficient design of 
these  policies  requires  knowledge  of  the  costs  associated  with  employment  protection 
legislation. In this paper we evaluate these costs by measuring firms’ willingness to trade 
fixed term for open ended contracts in exchange for a cut in the labour cost of permanent 
jobs. Our results are based on a panel of Italian firms in the engineering sector whose labour 
costs were reduced by a tax credit granted to firms hiring workers on open ended rather than 
fixed term  contracts.  The  trade off  is  identified  by  comparing  how  the  composition  of  
recruitment by type of contract changed for firms that received the tax credit and those that 
did not. Potential distortions due to self selection into the programme, firm specific time 
varying shocks or mechanical correlation induced by the selection rule into the programme, 
are accounted for by estimating the spurious effect of the tax credit in the years when it was 
not in force. Estimation is carried out in both a parametric and non parametric setting that 
uses p score to control for different probabilities of receiving the tax credit. We found that 
firms value the possibility of hiring one per cent new workers on a fixed term contract as 
much as a cut in the labour cost of an open ended worker in the range of 1.3 2.8 per cent. 
This result helps to explain recent employment growth in Italy, where the share of fixed term 
contracts among new hires grew from 34 to 42 per cent between 1995 and 2003. Using our 
most conservative results, we evaluate that the labour cost reduction associated with this 
expansion amounted to anything between 10.4 and 22.4 per cent. Given the elasticity of 
employment to wages, the advent of flexibility in the Italian labour market can account for a 
large share, between 37 and 80 per cent, of employment growth in the private sector.  
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How large are the costs born by firms because of employment protection legislation 
(EPL)? This question is at the core of the renewed policy effort of the European Union, as 
confirmed recently in the Kok report (EU, 2003), towards “flex security”, that is the attempt 
to combine better and more secure jobs with a highly flexible labour market. The basic idea 
is  to  increase  the  number  of  permanent  jobs  by  cutting  their  labour  costs,  thereby 
compensating firms for giving up the flexibility associated with fixed term contracts. The 
efficient design of this policy requires knowledge of the costs associated with EPL. 
Recent examples of such a policy can be found in both Spain and Italy. In 1997, Spain 
drastically cut payroll taxes on new permanent contracts for a period of two years in an 
attempt  to  reduce  the  segmentation  of  the  Spanish  labour  market  induced  by  the  1984 
liberalization of temporary contracts. Firing costs for unfair dismissal were also lowered by 
around  25  per  cent  (Benito  and  Hernando,  2003).  Kugler,  Jimeno  and  Hernanz  (2002) 
estimated that this reform reduced the cost of hiring young workers on a permanent contract 
by about 10 and 7 per cent in first and second year respectively. In the year 2000, Italy 
adopted a similar provision by granting a large tax credit to firms hiring workers on an open 
ended contract. The implied cut in labour costs has been evaluated at between 9 per cent and 
nearly 60 per cent depending on both the industry and the geographical area (Cipollone and 
Guelfi, 2003).  
Knowledge of the value  firms  attach to flexible contracts is crucial  for an optimal 
design of this type of compensation policy. Despite the simplicity of the underlying concept, 
this information is rather difficult to obtain because of the multidimensional nature of the 
costs associated with firing. Along with monetary expenditures (severance payment), there 
are burdens associated with the length of the administrative and legal procedures and the cost 
of uncertainty. OECD (1999) provides a complete list of the costs generated by employment 
protection legislation.  
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Tony Atkinson, Andrea Brandolini, Antonio Ciccone, Federico Cingano, Andrea Ichino, 
Marco  Magnani,  Alfonso  Rosolia,  Roberto  Torrini,  Manuela  Samek  Lodovici,  Eliana  Viviano  and  to 
participants  at  the  16
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th  Annual 
Conference (Modena 23 24 September 2004) for helpful comments and suggestions.  Our special thanks go to 
Elena Falcone for providing the data and for her continuous support. We are responsible for any mistakes. The 





Three main strands of literature have tried to measure the magnitude of firing costs. A 
first line of research has attempted to evaluate these costs within the framework of dynamic 
labour demand,
2 which was developed after the seminal work of Oi (1962). Along this line 
Rota (2004) estimated that in Italy these costs account for as much as 15 per cent of monthly 
wages. In a similar setting Aguirregabiria and Alonso Borrego (1999) found that firing costs 
in Spain amounted to 51 per cent of the gross annual wages of a permanent worker over the 
period 1982 1993. For France Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001) found that the bulk of the 
adjustment cost is due to the firing of permanent workers.  
A second strand of literature has attempted to compute directly the cost of EPL by 
examining  the  regulation  or  the  actual  costs  declared  by  firms.  Using  direct  evidence, 
Abowd and Kramarz (2003) evaluate that in 1992 separation costs in France amounted to 
anything between 56 and 126 per cent of average labour costs. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) 
suggest that in Italy firing costs are equivalent to about 18 monthly wages.  
A third group of empirical studies has attempted to quantify the size of firing costs by 
estimating their impact on the level of employment. This large body of literature has not 
reached any conclusive consensus (OECD, 1999, 2006). 
In this paper we offer and alternative way to ascertain these costs by evaluating the 
willingness of firms to give up flexibility in exchange for a cut in labour costs. We estimate 
the labour demand for fixed term contracts compared with that for open ended contracts as a 
function of the relative wage and firm specific controls and derive the money value that 
firms attach to fixed term contracts. Hence, our framework allow us to infer the value of 
flexibility directly rather than  from ex post computation. However, the reliability of this 
approach  impinges on the assumption that the relative wage coefficient  in the  estimated 
labour demand equation measures a causal effect. In most settings this is a heroic assumption 
because of firms’ unobservable heterogeneity and because the standard response of labour 
supply to changes in relative wages acts as a confounding factor. In this paper we overcome 
these problems by resorting to a policy induced shift in labour demand not directly linked to 
a variation in wages. To this end we exploit the introduction in Italy, at the end of 2000, of a 
tax credit for firms choosing to hire workers on open ended rather than fixed term contracts. 
This  regulation  created  a  trade off  for  the  firm  between  fewer  flexible  contracts  and  a 
substantial wage cut. Observing the variation in firms’ response, we are able to uncover the 
rate at which this trade off occurs. We run our exercise on a panel of about 310 Italian firms 
                                                 
2  Hamermesh  and  Pfann  (1996)  have  recently  reviewed  the  literature  on  the  nature  and  determinants  of  




operating in the engineering sector in the period 1998 2002, which hired both fixed term and 
open ended workers for the whole period. 
Identification of the effect of the tax credit on the relative demand for fixed term and 
open ended workers is based on the comparison of changes in this relative demand of firms 
that  received  the  tax  credit  and  those  that  did  not.  Recovering  the  causal  effect  means  
controlling for potential distortions due to self selection into the programme because of firm 
time specific shocks. On top of this standard problem, we need to take into account that  the 
selection  rule  into  the  tax  credit  –  raising  the  stock  of  permanent  workers  –  might  be  
correlated with the relative labour demand. However, neither of these problems affects the 
estimate of the causal effect of tax credit on relative demand as long as potential bias is 
constant over time. In the standard diff in diff setting this time invariance is assumed away. 
In our setting we can instead estimate the bias because we observed both relative labour 
demand and selection rule in the years in which the tax credit was not in force. As this bias is 
always  zero  in  our  data,  we  recover  the  causal  effect  a  standard  difference  in  means 
estimator,  using  both  a  parametric  setting  and  the  non parametric  version  devised  by 
Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998) and  Blundel and Costa Diaz (2000).  
 We estimate that hiring one per cent  new workers on a fixed term contract is worth as 
much as a cut of between 1.3 per cent (parametric setting) and 2.8 per cent (non parametric 
setting)  in  the  labour  cost  of  a  worker  hired  on  an  open ended  contract.  The  estimate 
suggests that the effect of the tax credit was large. It implies that in the period 1995 2003 
firms enjoyed an overall labour cost reduction ranging from 10.4 to 22.4 per cent as the share 
of fixed term contracts out of all newly hired workers rose from 34 to 42 per cent. In Italy 
the long run elasticity of employment to wages is estimated to be around  0.3; therefore we 
calculated that the rise in the share of flexible contracts can explain a large part, from 3.1 to 
6.7, of the 8.4 percentage point increase in private sector total employment.  
This paper  is organised as  follows. In Section 2 we discuss our empirical strategy 
while Section 3 is devoted to a detailed illustration of the characteristics of the tax credit; 
Section 4 presents the data; Section 5 discusses the identification of the causal effect of the 
tax credit on relative labour demand; Section 6 presents the main results; Section 7 recovers 
the trade off between flexibility and wage cut. Section 8 uses this result to evaluate the effect 
of the increase in fixed term contracts among newly hired workers in Italy between 1995 and 






2. The statistical framework for estimating the value of fixed-term contracts 



















where w represents the labour cost of an open ended contract, H indicates recruitments and 
superscripts ft and oe indicate fixed term and open ended contracts, respectively. In words, 
our definition of the value of flexibility, measured in terms of the labour cost of an open 
ended worker, represents the percentage reduction in the labour cost w that firms are willing 
to trade for an increase of one percentage point in the share of total new workers hired on an 
open ended contract.  
 In order to measure how much firms value flexible contracts, we use a simple model 
that  relates  the  ratio  between  the  shares  of  fixed term  compared  with  open ended 
engagements to their corresponding relative wages. The workhorse used in this paper is a 
standard partial equilibrium model for labour demand and the supply of fixed term relative 
to open ended workers:
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) log( , which represent the (log of) supply and demand for 
fixed term relative to open ended workers (for  firm i at time t), depend on the (log of) 





) log( ), on  it Z , that is the firm’s 
time varying characteristic, on  it TC and  it SH , two shifters specific for demand and supply 
respectively, on  i n and  i f  standing for time invariant firm’s characteristics, on year effects 
( t e and  t l ), and on idiosyncratic shocks ( it h and  it m ). The labour demand shifter TCit is the 
                                                 
3 This simple model has been widely applied in the literature on Skill Biased Technical Changes to explain the 
relationship between the relative supply and relative wage of skilled and unskilled workers (Autor, Katz, 
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euro value of the tax credit (more on this in the next section) and 
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Solving for equilibrium conditions we have the following two reduced forms: 
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If we had both the relative demand and relative supply shifters we would be able to identify 
both labour demand and labour supply elasticities, thereby pinning down firms’ trade off 
between flexibility and labour cost reduction. The elasticity of relative labour demand would 
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At this stage of our research we are not able to provide a credible labour supply shifter, so 
that we cannot identify 1 b . However, a labour demand shifter may still allow us to recover 
the labour supply slope 1 g , thereby making some statements about 2 b , the measure of the 
reaction of relative labour demand to the variation in its shifter. Note that when  1 g  is very 
large,  i.e.  the  elasticity  of  labour  supply  to  relative  wages  is  large,  then  1 b   is  a  good 
approximation  of 2 b .  In  contrast,  if  labour  supply  is  rigid,  1 b   is  lower  than  2 b   as  it 
incorporates the wage reaction  needed to  increase the relative  labour supply  in order to 
match the higher relative labour demand. Thus  1 b  represents the market reaction to the shift 
in labour demand and can be interpreted as the lower bound of the reduction in the share of 
fixed term contracts firms are willing to trade for the labour cost cut granted by the tax 
credit. Note that we can obtain this important parameter by estimating equation 3 by itself. If 
we use  1 b rather than  2 b to compute the VFC, then this value represents the wage variation at 
which the market, not just the firms, trades one percentage point of fixed term hires. This 
value is larger than that computed using 2 b , since part of the wage rise is needed to increase 
the labour supply of open ended workers. In this sense it represents an upper bound to the 
value for firms of flexible contracts.  
 
The labour demand shifter we use in this paper is a recent policy intervention in the 
Italian labour market that reduced the relative labour cost of open ended workers. Starting 
from October 2000 the Italian government rewarded firms choosing to hire workers under 
open ended contracts through a tax credit of about € 413 (€ 620 for workers in the South) per 
month and per worker from the hiring moment until the end of December 2003
6. This tax 
credit  could  be  claimed  against  any  type  of  taxes,  such  as  income  tax,  social  security 
contributions, and value added tax.  
                                                 
5 The two shifters play the role of exclusion restrictions in the structural form (1) and (2). In the absence of 
such restrictions we are unable to tell whether the sample variation is attributable to changes in the demand or 
supply schedule, as both schedules react to the same determinants. In contrast, if we have a variable such as SH 
that shifts only labour supply and leaves labour demand unaffected we can identify of the slope of this second 
schedule. By the same token we can identify  the labour supply slope if we have a labour demand shifter.    







This shifter can provide more information on the value of flexible contracts under a 
more restrictive assumption. As a matter of fact, if we could claim that  1 2 b b - =  then the 









b b ; this restriction seems to 
be reasonable in our setting as it implies that firms’ relative labour demand reacts in the 
same way to a change in the relative wage as to a change in non wage labour costs. This 
assumption is also embedded in any model in which firms equate labour productivity with 
total  labour  cost  rather  than  just  the  wage.  As  an  example  assume,  that  the  production 
function is a CES 
(5)  ( ) ( )( ) [ ]r r r w w
1
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where  FTit  and  OEit  represent  new  hiring  under  fixed term  and  open ended  contracts 
respectively, then the relative demand for fixed term relative to open ended workers turns 
out to be, in logarithmic form, equal to 
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with ( ) ( ) t t it it it b a D log 1 log r w w - - - = ,  r s - = 1 1 , while LCit stands for the total labour cost 
borne by firm i at time t, ft for fixed term and oe for open ended. In this simple framework, 
s  is the elasticity of substitution and measures the number of fixed term contracts firms are 
willing to trade for permanent jobs in exchange for a reduction in their relative costs. If we 
decompose total labour costs into their wage and non wage components and introduce the 
tax credit as a non wage cut, expression (6) becomes 
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with Eit and NWit representing wage and non wage costs for firm i at time t; VTCit is the 
actual reduction in labour costs due to the tax credit. This equation can be mapped into 
equation  (1)  by  assuming  that  s b b = = - 2 1 ,  ( )








































log  and  it D can be modelled with a combination of firms’ time varying controls 
plus fixed effects for firm and year.  





3. Subsidy for open-ended contracts 
Like many other OECD countries, Italy has attempted to reduce the negative effects of 
fixed term contracts.
7 The strategy adopted sought to increase the mobility out of fixed term 
contracts  by  providing  fiscal  incentives  to  firms  that  either  transform  temporary  into 
permanent positions or directly hire workers under open ended contracts. There are several 
examples  of  this  strategy.
8  However,  until  2000  these  incentives  were  small  and  often 
targeted to particular areas, firm types or worker categories.  
The Italian Finance Law for 2001 (issued at the end of 2000) provided instead a new 
incentive in the form of a general, automatic and quite generous tax credit to all firms hiring 
workers on open ended contracts. In particular, this provision stated that every firm hiring a 
new worker on a permanent basis would be rewarded with a tax credit of about € 413 (€ 620 
for workers in the South) per month and per worker from the moment of hiring until the end 
of December 2003.
9 This new tax credit applied to all hires taking place from October 2000. 
Thus, for a southern worker hired in October 2000 and retained until December 2003 each 
firm could receive about € 24,200. The tax credit was awarded only if both workers and 
firms met the required conditions. Workers were required to be at least 25 years old and not 
working with an open ended contract in the 24 months before the hiring. Firms could apply 
for the tax credit if the newly hired worker raised the overall level of permanent employment 
- at the firm level - above the average recorded in the period between October 1999 and 
September 2000. The tax credit could be claimed against any kind of taxes, such as income 
tax, social security contributions, or value added tax. Furthermore, it could be passed on to 
different  fiscal  years.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  tax  credit  could  be  cumulated  with  other 
existing subsidies. 
These rules were in force until an important regulatory change was introduced in the 
summer of 2002. Indeed, in July 2002 the Italian Government introduced a ceiling of about € 
652 million for the resources available for the new employment bonus. Since this ceiling had 
already been reached at the beginning of July, the tax credit was suspended. At the end of 
September 2002, the Government intervened again on this issue. It was decided that firms 
                                                 
7 Cipollone and Guelfi (2003) provide a full review of figures and regulations on fixed term contracts in Italy.  
8 Examples of such attempts are the incentives to transform training employment contracts into permanent ones 
or the tax credit for small firms hiring permanent workers in economically depressed areas.
 
9 The contribution provided  by this subsidy  was large: the percentage reduction in per capita labour costs 
induced by the tax credit (using data for 2000) ranges from about 9.3 per cent in the banking sector in the 
central and northern regions of the country to almost 60 per cent in the agricultural sector in the South. On 
average, in the private non farm sector the reduction amounts to about 30 per cent in the South and 16 per cent 




would receive a tax credit up to a given ceiling of employment growth and that all credits 
due for the period July December 2002 should be claimed in 2003 and by instalments. The 
subsidy for hires taking place in 2003 was to be regulated by the Financial Law, which 
simply extended the new September rules to 2003 for all firms already benefiting from the 
tax credit. Moreover, it prolonged the functioning of the employment bonus up to 2006, 
although reducing significantly the monthly amounts granted.  
  
The  new  tax  credit  seems  to  have  been  very  successful  in  both  2001  and  2002. 
According to the figures collected by the Ministry of Finance it involved on average about 
110,000  workers  in  2001  and  300,000  in  2002.  Because  of  the  new  regulation  the 
programme was less popular from 2003 onwards. 
 
4. Data description 
Estimation  has  been  carried  out on  the  micro data  collected  by  Federmeccanica  (the 
Italian federation of private engineering firms) for its annual national survey on the situation 
of the engineering industry. Designed in 1976 to fulfil the information duties agreed with the 
trade unions in the collective agreement signed in that year, this survey provides yearly data 
on a wide set of variables covering different aspects at the firm and plant level.
10 Though the 
survey has experienced several changes over time in the topics chosen and/or in the detail 
required,  information  on  the  structure  and  dynamics  of  both  employment  and  average 
earnings is available (although with different in depth possibilities) from the very first year 
of data collection. Nonetheless,  micro data in electronic  form are only available starting 
from the second half of the 1990s. We have access to data for the years 1998, 1999, 2001 
and 2002 (no survey was carried out in 2000). The number of answering firms ranges from a 
minimum of 2448  in 2001 to a maximum of 2979  in 1998. However, we restricted the 
sample to firms with only a single plant that have answered at least both the 2001 and 2002 
surveys, with non missing observations for the share of hirings and for wages.
11 Moreover, 
                                                 
10 The survey provides information on the structural characteristics of the firm (number of establishments, 
industry, geographical location); on the level and composition of employment (employment stock  and hiring 
by gender, type of contract, and level of skill); on earnings (average nominal monthly wages and bonuses by  
worker  qualification);    working hours  (contractual  working  hours,  overtime  work, hours  lost,   number  of 
workers  involved  in  overnight  shifts);  union  status  (union  representation,  number  of  union  in  the  firms, 
company wage bargaining).  
11 We concentrated on one plant firms because for some crucial variables such as the wage we only have 




we chose to deal only with interior solutions and we therefore kept in the sample only firms 
choosing  to  hire  both  open ended  and  fixed term  workers.  We  needed  to  impose  this 
additional restriction because we do not have the required information to model the two  
corner solutions (not hiring on fixed term contract or not hiring on open ended contract) 
without resorting to strong functional assumptions. Therefore our results are conditional on 
firms that have hired with both types of contracts. We end up with about 307 firms. Table 1, 
column 1, includes some basic information about the most important variables used in the 
empirical  analysis.  On  average,  selected  firms  are  of  medium  size  with  about  200 
employees;  nominal  monthly  wages  are  about  €  1600,  with  those  paid  to  fixed term 
employees being about 30 per cent lower than those of open ended workers.
12 On average 
our firms hire about 26 workers every year, which corresponds to an inflow rate of about 13 
per cent; about 61 per cent of all newly hired employees are hired on a fixed term contract. 
About  25  per  cent  of  the  employees  are  female  and  about  68  per  cent  are  blue collar 
workers. Workers holding a fixed term contract represent about 11 per cent of the stock of 
employees.  In  order  to  evaluate  how  different  our  sample  is  from  the  rest  of  the  firms 
included in the Federmeccanica survey, in column 3 of Table 1 we report the mean values 
computed on the sample enlarged to include those firms that do not meet the criteria of being 
present in both 2001 and 2002. The most important difference is that the average size shrinks 
to about 150 employees. However, the structural characteristic of the two samples remains 
about the same. The average wage is € 1560 (about 3 per cent less than our sample), the 
share of new workers to total employment is about 14 per cent (one percentage point more), 
and  its  composition  in  term  of  fixed term  versus  open ended  contracts  is  virtually 
unchanged.  Including in the sample firms that have not hired new workers on fixed term 
and open ended contracts does not alter the qualitative characteristics of the sample except 
                                                 
12 This ratio represents approximately the actual wage gap between open ended and fixed term workers since 
we do not have information on individual workers’ wages, nor on the average wage by type of contract. We 
only have average wages for each of the 16 job types corresponding to each different contractual position (we 
do not consider apprenticeship, which is a special contract targeted to young workers) defined by the collective 
agreement for the industry. These positions are grouped into three main categories (blue collars, intermediate 
positions and white collars) and within each group they are ranked from the least to the most skilled. As a 
proxy for the wage of fixed term contracts we use the average wage of the two least skilled groups among the 
blue collars and the least skilled workers among the white collars. We use the remaining categories to compute 
the wages for open ended workers. Empirical evidence confirms that these assumptions are not unreasonable. 
Indeed, according to our data set, in the period 1998 2002 about 73 out of 100 blue collar workers were hired 
on a fixed term contract, while the corresponding share among white collars was only 31 per cent. About 87 
per cent of all newly hired fixed term workers were blue collars, whose share of total hires (both open ended 
and fixed term) was about 74 per cent. Using these assumptions on wage measures, we found that in our 
sample fixed term workers earn about 30 per cent less than open ended ones, a number that is not far from the 




for the average size of the firms, which shrinks to about 90 employees.  We conclude that 
our  selection  criteria  do  not  alter  dramatically  the  characteristics  of  the  Federmeccanica 
survey except for the average size of the firms.    
 
A preliminary look at the log of new workers hired on fixed term compared with open 
ended contracts before and after the tax credit reveals that something occurred in 2001 and 
2002. In Figure 1 we have plotted, for every year in our sample, the empirical distribution of 
firms with respect to the hiring composition  by type of contract, distinguishing  between 
those that increased the stock of open ended workers and those that did not. We used this 
criterion because it is the rule that allowed firms to receive the labour cost cut when the tax 
credit came to force in 2001. The first panel compares the cumulative distribution of raw 
data. Although firms that increase the share of open ended workers over the stock of the 
previous  year tend systematically to hire  fewer  fixed term than open ended workers, the 
difference  becomes  larger  in  both  2001  and  2002  compared  with  previous  periods.  The 
change  in  the  composition  of  hiring  appears  even  more  noticeable  when  we  control  for 
firms’ fixed effect. Before the tax credit the two cumulative distributions were almost one on 
top of the other; they spread apart in 2001 and especially in 2002.  However, to evaluate how 
strong  this shift is we turn to the econometric exercise.  
5. Identification assumptions 
Following the analysis of Section 2, the empirical counterparts of the two reduced 
forms (3) and (4) can be written as  
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Here we do not use the direct measure of the labour cost reduction induced by the tax credit 
(TCit ) but rather DTCit, i.e. a dummy variable indicating treatment status in year t;  it takes 
                                                                                                                                                    
data for the year 2000, Cipollone and Guelfi (2003) estimate a 32 per cent raw differential for males and a 9 per 




value  1  if  firm  i  has  increased  the  stock  of  permanent  employees  in  year  t  and  zero 
otherwise
13. As the tax credit was started in 2001 we expect   t b1
~
and  t c1
~  to be zero for 
t<2001. This is the easiest way to identify the effect of the tax credit without resorting to 
wage information. The rationale for choosing the dummies rather than the actual value for 
the tax credit is that, as discussed, we do not have a precise measure for the wages paid to 
workers with different types of contracts. While our approximation seems to be reasonable, 
it can still weaken the robustness of our results. To overcome this problem we focus only on 
those results that can be obtained without using any measure of relative wages. Equation (8) 
allows us to identify the important parameter  t b1
~  that can still be used to evaluate the VFC 
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There are three major econometric difficulties in directly estimating equation (8). The 
first problem concerns the nature of the effect that we can actually identify. Equation (8) 
implicitly assumes that the effect of the tax credit on the composition of recruitment is the 
same for each firm, if different over time. However, if there are heterogeneous reactions to 
the tax credit, the only parameter that is identified under the standard assumptions (discussed 
below)  is the average Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT), that is the effect of the tax 
credit for those firms that actually used it. Nothing can be said about the effect of the tax 
credit for the average firm in the sample. 
The other two problems concern the actual possibility of recovering the ATT in our 
specific context. Identification of 
t b 1
~ impinges on the fact that the tax credit is not correlated 
to unobserved shocks to the firm’s composition of hiring by type of contract. One general 
concern regards time varying firm specific effects, since those that are constant over time 
are controlled for by firms’ fixed effects. Identification problems could arise if firms that in 
2001 2002 increased the share of open ended workers were reacting to some specific shock 
rather than to the tax credit. In this instance, the OLS estimates of the slopes t b1
~  measure the 
correlations between this shock and the tax credit rather than the causal effect of the labour 
cost cut on relative labour demand. On top of this standard problem we face the additional 
                                                 
13 As stated in Section 3 firms received the tax credit if  they increased the share of open ended worker in total 
employment compared with the same share in the preceding year and the worker hired on permanent job was at 




difficulty that the selection rule into treatment - firms are entitled to the tax credit if they 
increase the number of workers hired on open ended contracts - might induce a mechanical 
correlation between the indicator for the treated status DTCit, and the outcome variable (the 
log of the ratio between fixed term and open ended contracts).  
To discuss the identification assumptions we need in the face of these two problems let 
us simplify equation (8) and assume that Z variables are not there: 
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for t=2001 or t=2002, as in these two years the tax credit was in force; in contrast for 
t=1998 or t=1999 OLS on 8’ return,  
(10’) 
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=   
as in these years there could be no causal effect of the tax credit on the composition of 
the new workers by type of contract.  
First note that if  0
~
1 = tOLS b  for t< 2000 then OLS coefficients of DTCit for t> 2000 
identify  the  causal  effect  of  the  tax  credit  on  the  log  of  composition  of  the  recruits 
( t tOLS b b 1 1
~ ~
=   for  t>  2000),  provided  that  the  covariance  between  the  error  term  and  the 
















This is the standard assumption for a diff in diff estimator. In the case in which  0
~
1 ¹ tOLS b for 
t< 2000 we can still recover the true effect of the tax credit by taking the difference between 
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As in the case in which  0
~
1 = tOLS b  for t<2000,  this difference recovers the true effect 
as long as the bias due to the covariance between treated status and error term is constant 
                                                                                                                                                    
measure with error the treated status of firms and the estimated effect of the tax credit can be regarded as a 




over time.  To be more explicit about the assumption needed to identify the true effect of the 
tax credit, regardless of the value of  tOLS b1
~
 for t< 2000, let us assume that the error term has 
three components: 









it it DTC DTC - + + + + = h e s h e s n z  
with both time trend ( t e ) and time varying firm specific shock ( it h ) differing between 
firms that increase permanent employment (superscript T) and those that do not (superscript 
C). With this structure of the error terms and recalling that DTCit is a dummy variable the 




















{ } { } ] 0 | ~ [ ] 1 | ~ [ ] 0 | ~ [ ] 1 | ~ [ 1 ' ' = - = - = - = =
it i it i it i it i DTC E DTC E DTC E DTC E A n n n n  is due to 
the  difference  in  the  composition  of  the  treated  and  control  group  over  time; 
( )( ) ' 2
t t
C T A e e s s - - =  is due to the difference in the trend between treated and control 
group,  and 
{ } { } ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ 3 ' ' ' ' = - = - = - = =
it it it it it it it it DTC E DTC E DTC E DTC E A h h h h   is  the 
component  due  to  the  potential  self selection  of  firms  into  the  treatment  because  of  
differential firm time specific shock in the years when the tax credit was  in force or due to 
the  mechanical  correlation  between  the  indicator  of  treatment  status  and  the  year  firm 
specific shock. In a standard diff in diff framework one needs to assume that these three 
components are all zero. 
However, our data sets allows us to relax some of these assumptions. Since we have a 
panel of firms the bias component due to specific fixed effect can be controlled for by means 
of  a  fixed  effect  estimator.  In  order to  evaluate  the  importance  of  the  second  and  third 
component of the bias we can compare two  tOLS b1
~
estimated for two years in which the tax 
credit was not in force, such as 1999 and 1998.
14 If these coefficients are all zero then the 
bias in equation (10) is zero and we can identify the effect of the tax credit as a simple 
difference between the mean outcome of treated and control units; if they are different from 
zero but their difference is zero then the standard assumption for a diff in diff holds and we 
can identify the effect of the tax credit as the difference between two betas computed for  
                                                 
14 This is basically the same idea as that underlying the Adjusted for Differential Trend Diff in Diff estimator 




years with and without the tax credit in force. This case would emerge if, for example, the 
joint  distribution  of  the  specific  time firm specific  shock  ( it h )  and  the  indicator  of  the 
treatment status (DCTit) did not depend on time and if the trend were common to both the 
treated and the control group ( 0 = -
C T s s ). Finally, a non zero difference might suggest 
that the A2 and A3 components of the bias affect the estimate of the effect of the tax credit. 
We can take into account this potential distortion using as estimator of the causal effect of 
the tax credit the difference of two differences among betas, one computed on  years with 
and without the tax credit in force and one comparing two years without the tax credit; in our 





( 1998 , 1 1999 , 1 1999 , 1 2002 , 1 OLS OLS OLS OLS b b b b - - - . 
The weakness of the parametric approach of equation (8’) is that it attributes the same 
weight  to  all  the  control  units,  regardless  of  their  closeness  to  the  treated  units.  This 
characteristic might be a problem if the observable variables that drive the selection process 
into the treatment status do not have the same support for treated and control units, or have 
different  distribution  over  the  common  support.  To  take  into  account  these  additional 
problems  we  rely  on  the  matching  estimators  based  on  the  probability  of  being  treated 
(Heckman et al. 1997, Heckman et alt. 1998 and  Blundel and Costa Diaz 2000). For each 
year of our sample we compute a matching estimator based on the propensity score: 
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) log( ) log(  
where it w is the weight of the i-th treated observation at time t and  ijt W represents the 
weight that it is given when comparing treated observation i with control observation j at 
time t. There are many ways of implementing this matching estimator depending on the 
algorithm  used  to  compute  ijt W .  We  use  the  Kernel  matching  version  implemented  by 
Becker and Ichino (2002) 
(13) 
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where G( ) is a kernel function, pj and pi are the estimated propensity scores – i.e. the 




In analogy with our discussion of the parametric case, we can directly read the causal 
effect of the tax credit from the estimator ATTKMt for t> 2000 if  ATTKMt =0 for t< 2002; if 
this  condition  does  not  hold  we  can  still  recover  the  causal  effect  of  the  tax  credit  by 
computing the difference between two matching estimators estimated one in a year with the 
tax credit and one without.  
6. Results 
In  order  to  implement  the  strategy  described  in  the  previous  section  we  begin  by 
estimating equation (8) with OLS by pooling all the observations for the period 1998, 1999, 
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In the second column of Table 2 we present the estimated  t b1
~ in a model without any 
type of control (not even fixed effect) beside the year dummies. The betas for the years in 
which the tax credit was in force, namely 2001 and 2002, are in the order of  .40 with a 
standard error in the order of .15.  The betas for the years in which the tax credit was not in 
force are in the order of  .30 with a standard error of .20. Reading these results at their face 
values one would conclude that the betas in the years in which the tax credit was in force 
identify the true causal effect of the tax credit on the composition of recruitments as the 
covariance between the indicator of the treated status and the error term is mostly noise. As 
discussed  in  the  previous  section,  the  implication  of  this  finding  is  that  even  a  simple 
difference between the outcome of treated and control units in the year for which the tax 
credit  was  in  force  should  be  able  to  recover  the  casual  effect  of  the  tax  credit  on  the 
composition of the hirings. Therefore one would conclude that this causal effect is about  
.40. However, the point estimate of the treatment status for the year before 2000 is large 
enough to make us uncomfortable about discarding its implication on the ground that it not 
significantly different from zero. This consideration leads us to include more controls in the 
equation. In column 3 of Table 2 we estimate the equation including the usual treatment 
status indicator along with the firm fixed effect. Adjusting for time invariant characteristics 
of the firm it further increases the slope of the indicator of the treated status for the years in 
which the tax credit was in force (from  .40 to about  .45 on the average for 2002 and 2001), 
while at the same time it shrinks the same slopes for the years in which the tax credit was not 




estimates improves marginally but not enough to take their statistical significance above the 
usual threshold. Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that the bias in equation 10 is equal 
to zero. On the basis of these findings we restate that the effect of the tax credit on the 
composition of   hirings is of the order of  .45.  
Column 4 of Table 2 presents the estimate of model 14 with a series of additional 
controls. We include controls for the gender and skill composition of employees and for the 
share of workers involved in overnight shifts to account for possible firm specific trends in 
the composition of the  labour force. For instance, such an occurrence would  be brought 
about by the need to accommodate technical upgrading of the production process, or to meet 
quality  standards  required  by  new  customers.
15  In  these  cases  the  share  of  open ended 
workers increases for reasons other than the tax credit. Firms’ fixed effect cannot capture 
this trend. Moreover, as the composition by type of contract of the flow of new workers 
might reflect the composition of pre existing stocks, we also include in the equation the 
share of fixed term workers relative to total employment in the previous year.  Finally, as the 
composition  of  recruitments  might  be  influenced  by  firms’  specific  business  cycle  we 
include  in  the  equation  the  (log)  number  of  hours  of  overtime  work,  hours  of  wage 
supplementation funds and hours lost because of strikes.  
All these additional controls reinforce the pattern that emerged in the previous two 
models. The coefficients of the treated status increase in 2001 and especially in 2002, rising 
on average to  .50, but remain constant in 1999 and drop further in 1998. As the standard 
errors seem rather unaffected  by the  inclusion of these additional  controls the statistical 
significance of the last two coefficients weakens further. 
We conclude that the tax credit seems to have had a causal effect on the composition 
of hirings by reducing the share of fixed term contracts in favour of open ended contracts. 
Using the most conservative of the above results we can quantify this effect at  .39, which 
implies that the share of workers hired on open ended contracts out of all recruits increased 
by 7.6 percentage points because of the tax credit. As the average number of recruits in our 
sample equals 26, our result implies that the tax credit induced firms to hire two workers on 
open ended contracts that would have been  hired on  fixed term contracts otherwise.  
As discussed in the previous section, direct comparison of the average outcome for the 
treated and the control group could produce highly biased results if the two groups do not 
                                                 





share the same support of the observable variables or have different distributions of these 
variables within a common support.  
To  address  this  problem  we  have  implemented  the  matching  estimator  (13).  As  a 
preliminary step we have estimated the propensity score (the probability of each observation 
of being treated
16) and plotted in Figure 2 a panel for every year. Predicted probabilities are 
reported on the vertical axis; the horizontal axis presents the actual treated status with a 
value  of  0  meaning  “not  treated”  and  a  value  of  1  “treated”.  Each  box  presents  the 
distribution of firms by predicted probability of being treated. It begins at the 25
th percentile 
and  ends  at  the  75
th  percentile;  the  line  in  the  middle  represents  the  median  of  the 
distribution.
17  This  graph  allows  us  to  evaluate  whether  treated  and  control  units  have 
propensity  scores  located  on  a  common  support.  In  our  case  about  50  per  cent  of  the 
observations are estimated to have a probability of being treated in the range of .55 .65. The 
lack of an appreciable difference  in the predicted probabilities of  being treated between 
treated and control units suggests that the observed variables used to estimate the propensity 
score  account  for  most  of  the  selection  in  the  treatment.    Note  also  that  the  estimated 
probabilities change little over time and keep a good degree of overlapping between treated 
and  control  group.  These  results  allow  us  to  safely  compare  treated  and  control,  as  the 
members of the two groupa have a close probability of being treated.          
 
Table 3 presents the results of the matching estimator. Column 2 reports the estimator 
(13) computed on the row data so that it can be regarded as a non parametric version of  
model 1 in Table 2.  Results are almost identical to those of Table 3. In the years in which 
the tax credit was in force (2001 and 2002)  the difference in the log share of fixed to open 
ended contract outcomes between treated and control firms is about  .42 with a standard 
error in the order of .15.
18 In contrast when the tax credit was not in force the point estimate 
shrinks and the standard errors increase; as a result the effect of the treatment status in these 
years cannot be distinguished from zero.  Taken at the face value this result would imply that 
the effect of the tax credit is in the order of  .40. However, the same considerations discussed 
for the parametric case apply here. Therefore we closely followed the parametric analysis 
                                                 
16 We use the implementation of Becker and Ichino (2002) and we balance the observed variables used to 
estimate the propensity score within each of the five groups in which we divide the distribution of the 
propensity score.    
17 The line emerging from below the box extends up to the data point equal to pc25 1.5*(pc75 pc25), where 
pc25 is the 25
th percentile and pc75 is the 75
th percentile. The line emerging from above the box extends up to 
the data point equal to pc75 1.5*(pc75 pc25).  




and recomputed the ATTKM estimator (13) on the share of fixed term to open ended contracts 
purged by the  firm’s  fixed effects (column 3) and the other covariates used  in Table 2, 
column 4. The matched estimators applied to data purged of the firm’s fixed effects basically 
tell the same story of a negative affect in the years in which the tax credit was in force, 
although  smaller  than  before  ( .33  instead  of   .40),  and  a  smaller  and  not  statistically 
significant effect in the years without tax credit. This pattern is reinforced when we use data 
purged by fixed effect and other observable variables. Taking the most conservative of these 
non parametric estimates we can conclude that the tax credit induced a shift in the log share 
of fixed to open ended contracts of about  .18, which implies that the share of recruits with 
open ended on all recruits increases by about 3.2 percentage points; in absolute terms this 
result implies that, on average for the sample, the tax credit induced firms to shift one new 
worker from a fixed term to an open ended contract.     
7. Evaluation of the value of flexible contracts 
Estimates of the reaction of the log of relative demand  ) log( oe
ft
H
H serve to compute the 
value of flexible contracts (VFC). Note, however, that the reduction in labour cost due to tax 
credit (i.e. the numerator of the formula defying the VFC) was limited in time, lasting at 
most three years. Therefore the expected cut in labour cost associated with the tax credit 
changes with the expected tenure: the longer the duration of the employment spell of the 
newly hired permanent worker, the lower the reduction in the labour cost associated with the 
tax credit. In Graph 3 we compute the value of flexible contracts for an employment spell 
ranging from 1 to 30 years.
19 The two lines in the graph are computed using as a measure of 
the effect of the tax credit the  most conservative estimates obtained with the parametric 
method ( .39 in Table 2) and the non parametric method ( .18 in Table 3).   
According to our calculation firms would have valued the opportunity to hire 1 per 
cent of their new workers on fixed term contracts rather than open ended contracts as much 
as a reduction in the wage of open ended workers of between 3 and 7 percentage points in 
the first three years of the employment spell.
20 Thereafter the value of the flexible contracts 
                                                 
19 To compute the value of flexible contract we have made the following assumption: real wage constant at the 
2001 value, real interest rate of 1 per cent and  North South composition  calculated on the basis of employees 
in industry excluding construction. The reference labour cost is the average of the sample 
20 Here we derived  the value of the flexible contract by looking only at the empirical counterpart of equation 
(3). As explained in Section 2 this is only an approximation of the actual value that firms attribute to the 
flexibility. However, the quality of this approximation depends on the coefficient  
t c1




declines when the reduction in the labour cost due to the tax credit shrinks as a proportion of 
the overall wage bill of the new worker. After 5 years the VFC has already dropped within  
the range of 1.9 4.4 per cent and to between 0.4 and 0.8 per cent for employment spells 
lasting 30  years.  As  in Italy the average duration of employment spells  is  estimated at 
around 8 years (Cingano and Rosolia 2003, Garibaldi and Violante 2005), we conclude that 
the possibility of hiring 1 per cent of new workers with a fixed term contract is equivalent, 
on average, to a permanent reduction  in the wage of an open ended worker of anything 
between 1.3 and 2.8 per cent. 
Since the average firm in the sample hires about 26 people a year and therefore one 
new workers is equivalent to 3.8 per cent of new staff, our result suggests that an average 
firm would be indifferent between hiring one worker on a fixed term contract and the same 
worker on an open ended contract provided his wage is reduced by anything between 5 and 
10.7 percentage points.     
 
8. Implications for aggregate employment growth 
The results of the previous section can help to explain the rather puzzling dynamics 
observed in Italian employment in recent years. Between 1995 and 2003 total employment in 
the Italian private sector grew by about 1.4 million, i.e. an overall increase of 8.4 per cent. In 
the same period value added rose by 13.7 per cent. The ex post elasticity was about 0.6, a 
very  large  and  unprecedented  value  by  Italian  standards;  in  the  previous  fifteen  years 
employment  declined  by  4.5  per  cent  while  output  increased  by  37  per  cent.  Wage 
moderation and the introduction of flexible contracts have been invoked to explain this new 
feature of the Italian economy (Brandolini at al. 2005). Indeed real wages remained basically 
constant over the period 1995 2003 and the share of fixed term contracts in all newly hired 
employees  grew  from  34  to  42  per  cent.  However,  the  actual  importance  of  the  new  
flexibility for the expansion of employment has yet to be quantified. Our results help to fill 
the gap. They indicate that firms in the engineering sector did value the growth of fixed term 
contracts as equivalent to a cut in the wage of an open ended worker of anything between 10 
and 22 per cent. In Italy the long run elasticity of employment to wages is estimated at 
around  0.3; therefore, applying the value of flexible contract for engineering firms to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
smaller  this  coefficient  the  better  the  approximation.  We  have  estimated  this  coefficient  using  the  same 
technique as for the estimation of 
t b1




whole private sector, we can calculate that the rise in the share of flexible contracts raised 
the long run level of employment by 3.1 6.7 percentage points. 
9. Conclusions 
In this paper we estimate the value firms attach to flexible labour contracts. We rely on 
a panel of Italian firms operating in the engineering sector in the period 1998 2002. We 
estimate a demand curve for flexible contracts relative to permanent ones by exploiting a 
reduction in the labour cost of open ended jobs granted to firms hiring new workers with 
open ended rather than fixed term contracts. Identification is achieved by comparing how 
the composition of recruitment by type of contract changed for firms that received the tax 
credit and those that did not. Potential distortions due to self selection into the programme, 
because of firm specific time varying shocks or the mechanical correlation induced by the 
selection rule into the programme, are accounted for by estimating the spurious effect of the 
tax credit in the years when it was not in force.  We found that firms appraised the possibility 
of hiring 1 per cent of new workers on temporary contracts as much as a reduction in the 
labour cost of a worker on an open ended contract in the range of 1.3 2.8 per cent. As the 
share of  fixed term contracts  in all  newly  hired employees grew  by 8 percentage points 
between 1995 and 2003 (from 34 to 42 per cent), the advent of flexibility in the Italian 
labour market was worth as much as a drop in the wage of permanent workers in the range of 
10 22 per cent. This labour cost cut might explain the large increase in Italian employment 
(between 3.1 and 6.7 of the overall 8.4 percentage points), which otherwise remains rather 




Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 
BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
  Firms in the sample:  For comparison 
 
All firms with a single 
plant and positive 
recruits  of both open 
ended and fixed term 
and in the sample in  
2001 and 2002 
All firms with a single 
plant and positive 
recruits  of both open 
ended and fixed term 
All firms with a single 
plant 
       
Wage(1)  1596  1559  1546 
        Open ended   1639  1596  1602 
        Fixed term  1130  1091  1098 
Recruits   26  22  12 
        Open ended   10  8  5 
        Fixed term  16  13  7 
Employees  205  149  89 
   Women  40  31  18 
   Blue collars  139  94  57 
Stock of fixed term workers (2)  0.11  0.12  0.08 
Employees involved in shifts (2)  0.66  0.66  0.65 
Wage Supplementation Fund (3)  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Over time  (3)  92  98  81 
Strikes (3)  7.4  5.5  4.0 
       
       
Number of observations  938  2941  9089 
Number of firms  307  1685  4599 
       
(1) Euros. (2) As a share of total employment. (3) Hours per employee. 
 








ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE TAX CREDIT ON  RELATIVE LABOUR 
DEMAND FOR FIXED-TERM WORKERS. LINEAR MODELS  




Model 1:  
no adjustment 
Model 2: 
Adjusted for firms’ 
fixed effects 
Model 3:  
Adjusted for firms’ 
fixed effects and 
other covariates
2 
       
-0.41  -0.44  -0.54 
Treated in 2002 ( 2002 , 1
~
b )  0.14  0.13  0.14 
-0.39  -0.45  -0.47 
Treated in 2001 ( 2001 , 1
~
b )  0.15  0.14  0.15 
-0.32  -0.25  -0.25 
Treated in 1999 ( 1999 , 1
~
b )   0.20  0.17  0.17 
-0.30  -0.11  -0.08 
Treated in 1998 ( 1998 , 1
~
b )   0.20  0.17  0.18 
       
Years’ fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firms’ fixed effect    Yes  Yes 
Other controls      Yes 
       
Number of firms  307  307  307 
Number of observations  938  938  938 
       
1 Estimate of equation 12 in the text for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002. Standard errors in italics. 
2 Number of employees, share of  women,  
blue collar  workers,  open ended  workers at time  t-1,  workers involved  in  overnight  shifts, log  of  per  worker hours  of  overtime ,  of  Wage 
Supplementation Fund and strikes. 
 






ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE TAX CREDIT ON RELATIVE LABOUR 
DEMAND FOR FIXED-TERM WORKERS.  
KERNEL MATCHING ESTIMATE  




Model 1:  
no adjustment 
Model 2: 
Adjusted for firms’ 
fixed effects 
Model 3:  
Adjusted for firms’ 
fixed effects and 
other covariates
2 
       
-0.45  -0.39  -0.27  ATTKM in 2002 
0.19  0.10  0.09 
-0.39  -0.27  -0.18  ATTKM in 2001 
0.15  0.10  0.08 
-0.31  -0.18  -0.12  ATTKM in 1999 
0.21  0.11  0.13 
-0.27  -0.11  0.01  ATTKM in 1998 
0.20  0.15  0.13 
       
       
Number of firms  307  307  307 
Number of observations  938  938  938 
       
1 Estimator presented in equation 13 in the text for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002. Standard errors in italics, they are computed by 
bootstrap with 100 repetitions. 
2 Number of employees, share of women,  blue collar workers, open ended workers at time t-1,  workers involved 
in overnight shifts, log of per worker hours of overtime, of Wage Supplementation Fund and strikes. 
 








CUMULATVE DENSITIES OF THE LOG OF FIXED-TERM RELATIVE TO 
OPEN-ENDED HIRES  
Panel (a) : Raw data  
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Log of the ratio of recruits with fixed term to recruits with open ended contracts  
 
Panel (a) : without firms’ fixed effects 
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Log of the ratio of recruits with fixed term to recruits with open ended contracts  
 
○ Firms increasing the stock of open ended 
workers 
∆ Firms not increasing the stock of open 
ended workers 
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0 1  
0 not treated 
 
1 treated 
1 The probit model includes as regressors the log of the number of employees of the firm, the share of 
women, blue collar workers, open ended workers at time t-1, share of workers involved in overnight shifts, 
log of per worker hours of overtime, of Wage Supplementation Fund, and strikes. 
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and using  39 .
~
1 - = b  (dashed line) or  18 .
~
1 - = b   
(solid line); the other parameters  are  52 . 3 ; 99 . 1 = = k l ; labour costs are kept constant at their 2001 
values and VTC amount to about € 7500 and € 5000, in the South and in the Centre North respectively  
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